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The court accomplished this without becoming embroiled in the academic
controversy over the res judicata effects to be accorded internationally
foreign judgments, a controversy which seems destined to confuse, rather
than clarify an already difficult concept.
JOSEPH P. AVERrLL
RESCISSION OF AN AUTO SALE UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE-HOW TO GET RID OF
A FOUR-WHEELED LEMON
Plaintiff purchased a new 1970 Jaguar automobile from defendant
dealer. Express warranties were made in the sales contract and the war-
ranty booklet, both of which were given to plaintiff upon delivery of the
vehicle. The booklet additionally disclaimed any warranty not specifically
mentioned and limited plaintiff's remedies to the repair or replacement of
defects. Both the disclaimer and limitation clauses were in the same size,
style, color, and print as the remaining portions of the booklet. Problems
in the steering, air conditioning, and doors developed almost immediately.
The vehicle also developed a tendency to stop for no apparent reason.
After three months, during which defendant had possession for repair
purposes for approximately fifty percent of the time, plaintiff sued for
rescission, or alternatively, for damages for breach of the implied war-
ranty of merchantability. The trial court ordered defendant to transfer
to plaintiff a new 1970 Jaguar with equipment comparable to that of
the non-conforming vehicle. When compliance with this order was found
to be impossible,' an amended final judgment was then entered, awarding
damages of $6,500.00, the market value of the car on that date. Since
the original price of the vehicle was $7,676.00, plaintiff was forced to
bear the depreciation loss of $1,176.00. Defendant appealed, and plaintiff
cross-appealed on the depreciation assessment. The District Court of
Appeal, Third District, held, affirmed: The limitations and disclaimers
were ineffective, rescission was proper, but plaintiff must bear the depre-
ciation. Orange Motors of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Dade County Dairies,
Inc., 258 So.2d 319 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
The decision in the instant case turned substantially on interpre-
tations of various sections of the Uniform Commercial Code,' which
has been adopted in all jurisdictions except Louisiana.' Dade County
Dairies presented a case of first impression for Florida in dealing with
1. The action did not come to trial until the latter part of 1971, and vehicles which
could comply with the court's order were unavailable.
2. Hereinafter referred to as the "Code."
3. Florida was one of the last states to do so, adopting the Code on Jan. 1, 1967. See
FLA. STAT. § 680.101 (1971).
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express warranties, implied warranties, rescission, and limitation of reme-
dies under the Code.
At common law, parties to a contract were competent to provide
an exclusive remedy for its breach.4 This rule, however, was eroded by
a recent line of consumer-oriented decisions.5 The trial court in Dade
County Dairies had held the attempted limitation of the remedy to be
effective,' but gave plaintiff relief through an extremely broad construction
of that clause. The same result was reached on appeal, but through an
entirely different approach. The appellate court held the limitation of the
remedy clause to be ineffective because the limitation was not conspicuous.
No section of the Code requires that limitations of remedies be made
in a conspicuous manner. The one part of the Code that controls attempted
limitations of this type is the unconscionability section. 7 Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,8 involved a limitations of remedies clause that,
as in Dade County Dairies, limited remedies to replacement or repair of
parts. In holding that limitation to be unconscionable, and thus inopera-
tive, the court noted that in an adhesion contract the misuse of a superior
bargaining position results in an agreement that more closely resembles a
law than a contract. The Code, in adopting the reasoning of Henningsen,
thus provides a check on the power to limit remedies through the requisite
of conscionability. The Dade County Dairies court, however, in declining
-- or neglecting--to make use of the safeguard of the unconscionability
provisions, has added a new dimension to Florida's version of the Code.
In measuring the attempted limitation by the standard required to dis-
4. See, e.g., Tucker v. Traylor Eng'r. & Mfg. Co., 48 F.2d 783 (10th Cir. 1931); D'Arcy
Spring Co. v. Ansin, 196 Ind. 98, 146 N.E. 214 (1925).
5. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1959).
6. The warranty provided, in part, as follows:
Subject to the condition of sale . . . and the limitations herein contained,
BMH (USA) Inc .... warrants to the purchase of goods from a distributor/dealer
for a period of twelve months or 12,000 miles, whichever first occurs after the date
on which the goods are purchased by the license user thereof, that it will exchange
or repair any part in need of replacement or repair by reason of defective material
or workmanship in manufacture ...
Exclusion of other express or implied warranties and personal injury claims;
this warranty is given in lieu of all warranties, conditions and liabilities whatso-
ever given by BMH (USA) Inc., its servants or agents or implied by common law
statute or otherwise.
Orange Motors, Inc. v. Dade County Dairies, Inc., 258 So.2d 319, 320 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972)
(emphasis added).
7. ... It is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least a minimum of
adequate remedies be available. If the parties intend to conclude a contract for sale
within this Article, they must accept the legal consequence that there be at least a
fair quantum of remedy for breach of the obligations or duties outlined in the
contract. Thus any clause purporting to modify or limit the remedial provisions
of this Article in an unconscionable manner is subject to deletion and in that event
the remedies made available by this Article are applicable as if the stricken clause
never existed.
U1IFORM COMMERCIAL Con § 2-719, Comment 1; FLA. STAT. § 672.719 (1971). See also
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302; FLA. STAT. § 672.302 (1971).
8. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Henningsen].
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claim warranties,9 the court has created an additional avenue of attack for
disgruntled consumers.
The court followed the language of the Code more closely in dealing
with the attempt to disclaim warranties. In holding that this disclaimer
was ineffective because it was not conspicuous, the court precisely fol-
lowed the Code."° Additionally, the court hinted that even if the dis-
claimers had been effective, rescission might still have been proper since
the vendor does not have an unlimited time to make the vehicle meet
the standards of the remaining warranties:
The buyer of an automobile is not bound to permit the seller
to tinker with the article indefinitely in the hope that it may
ultimately be made to comply with the warranty. . . . At some
point in time, if major problems continue to plague the auto-
mobile, it must become obvious to all people that a particular
vehicle simply cannot be repaired or parts replaced so that the
same is made free from defect."
The court in Dade County Dairies thus properly treated the war-
ranties that it considered; however, the court did not pass upon another
warranty that appeared from the evidence. The plaintiff had driven a
model prior to his purchase; in addition, the defendant employed various
advertising techniques and made certain affirmations as to quality. The
use of a model, if it becomes part of the basis of the bargain, creates an
express warranty that the goods will conform.'2 The affirmations, if more
than mere "puffing," would also create express warranties."
Under strict Code parlance, revocation of acceptance, rather than
rescission, is the proper label for the initial relief granted in Dade County
9. UZNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(2); FLA. STAT. § 672.316 (1971) provides that
any written exclusion or modification of the implied warranty of merchantability, and any
exclusion or modification of an implied warranty of fitness, must be conspicuous.
10. Id.
11. Orange Motors, Inc. v. Dade County Dairies, Inc., 258 So.2d 319, 321 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1972).
12. EXPRESS WARRANTIES BY AFFIRMATION, PROMISE,
DESCRIPTION, SAMPLE
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates
an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or
promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall
conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to
the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use
formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific
intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the
goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commenda-
tion of the goods does not create a warranty.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313; FLA. STAT. § 672.313 (1971).
13. Id.
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Dairies. The term "rescission" was intentionally omitted from the Code
to avoid ambiguities of interpretations. 4 In a Code state, acceptance of
a new automobile may be revoked when the purchaser does not receive
the item for which he bargained-a new car with new factory parts which
operates as represented.' 5
Under the Code, revocation of acceptance can only be made ef-
fective if certain distinct elements are present. The non-conformity
cannot be trivial.'6 Triviality is determined by the effect of the defect
upon the intended use of the goods.' 7 Seasonable notice of the revocation
must be given to the seller.'8 In certain circumstances, the buyer must
afford the seller a reasonable opportunity to cure the defects before revoca-
tion can be effective.' 9 In Dade County Dairies, the purchaser was afraid
to drive the vehicle, and since opportunity to cure had been afforded, the
court could well have awarded the proper Code remedy by finding a
revocation of acceptance.
In addition to its formulation of a new requirement for a proper
limitation of remedy, the court also deviated from the Code by assessing
the depreciation against the plaintiff. Section 2-608(3) of the Code
provides that "a buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties
with regard to the goods involved as if he had rejected them."2 Had
14. UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-608, Comment 1; FLA. STAT. § 672.608 (1971).
15. Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968).
16. Revocation of acceptance is possible only where the non-conformity sub-
stantially impairs the value of the goods to the buyer. For this purpose the test
is not what the seller had reason to know at the time of contracting; the question
is whether the non-conformity is such as will in fact cause a substantial impair-
ment of value to the buyer though the seller had no advance knowledge as to the
buyer's particular circumstances.
UNIFORM COM MERCIAL CODE § 2-608, Comment 2; FLA. STAT. § 672.608 (1971).
17. Campbell v. Pollack, 101 R.I. 223, 221 A.2d 615 (1966).
18. Subsection (2) requires notification of revocation of acceptance within a reason-
able time after discovery of the grounds for such revocation. Since this remedy
will be generally resorted to only after attempts at adjustment have failed, the rea-
sonable time period should extend in most cases beyond the time in which notifica-
tion of breach must be given, beyond the time for discovery of non-conformity
after acceptance, and beyond the time for rejection after tender.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-608, Comment 4; FLA. STAT. § 672.608 (1971). See also
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-607(3)(a), (5); FLA. STAT. §§ 672.607(3)(a), (5) (1971);
Marks v. Lehigh Brickface, Inc., 73 Dauph. Co. Rep. 244, 19 Pa. D. & C.2d 666 (1959).
19. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-608 provides for an opportunity to cure in two
situations. If acceptance occurred on the reasonable assumption that the non-conformity
would be cured, acceptance cannot be revoked without allowing a reasonable time for
cure to be effected. UNIFORM COMIERCIAL CODE § 2-608(1)(a). UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2-608(3) provides that the buyer who revokes his acceptance has "the same rights
and duties . . ." as if he had rejected. This provision thus appears to tie into UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-508, which burdens the rejecting purchaser with the duty to permit
cure in certain circumstances. See Murray, The Consumer and the Code, 23 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 11, 43 (1968). Dade County Dairies provides an excellent limitation on UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-508(1), which provides for cure upon rejection when "the time for
performance has not yet expired. . . ." The warranty provisions (See note 6 supra) meant
that the time for performance had not expired, but the court properly held that once notice
had been given, the vendor's time to cure was not unlimited, regardless of the existence of
a warranty period. See note 11 supra.
20. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-608(3); FLA. STAT. § 672.608(3) (1971).
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plaintiff rejected the vehicle upon delivery at the showroom, certainly
no duty to bear any depreciation would have attached. In Tiger Motor
Co. v. McMurtry,2 the vendor's assertion of a right to setoff the use value
of vendee's possession for 344 days was held to be without basis in light
of section 2-608 of the Code. Such a result is consistent with Florida's
posture in regard to total restoration of consideration upon rescission.22
The immediate effect of this portion of the decision in Dade County
Dairies is to allow the defendant to benefit from his breach at the expense
of the injured party.
The subject matter of the instant case makes this decision an impor-
tant one. As a case of first impression, the theories behind the decision
will have a strong effect on the development of Code case law in Florida.
Unfortunately, while perhaps a just result was reached, the setoff of
depreciation and the "conspicuousness" requirement for limiting remedies
were questionable holdings; additionally, an important express warranty
aspect was neglected. Finally, to stay within the framework of the Code,
revocation of acceptance, rather than common law rescission, should have
been awarded. The court did, however, establish valid law in noting that,
had the disclaimers of warranty been valid, rescission would still lie for
failure to measure up to the remaining warranties. Additionally, the court
properly balanced the vendor's right to cure before the time for perfor-
mance has expired with a requirement that such cure be effected within a
reasonable time of notification.
Dade County Dairies may well be the first step towards an effective
and persuasive use of the Uniform Commercial Code as a consumer
protection tool.
DAVID A. WOLFSON
ESTATE TAX-§ 2036 TRANSFERS WITH A RETAINED
LIFE INTEREST
Decedent transferred stock in three unlisted corporations to an irre-
vocable trust for the benefit of his children, retaining the right to vote
the transferred stock, to veto any disposition of such stock by the trustee,
a bank, and to remove the trustee and appoint another corporate trustee
as successor. The retained voting rights coupled with the vote of the
shares owned by the decedent individually at the time of his death gave
him a majority vote in each of the corporations. The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue determined that the value of the shares so transferred
was includable in the decedent's gross estate under the provisions of
21. 284 Ala. 238, 224 So.2d 638 (1969).
22. See, e.g., Singleton v. Foreman, 435 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1970), for a discussion of
Florida decisions on this point.
